reception The Labyrinth received from various quarters of the Mexican intelligentsia.
Basing his analysis on historical, sociological and psychological insights that are transformed into an original poetic prose, in The Labyrinth Paz critically examines a wide variety of Mexican myths and rituals, frozen historical forms, pre-modern elements that persist in spite of the spirit of change, repeated failures to take advantage of moments of potential cultural renewal, and specific intellectual and moral elements that have come together to shape modern Mexican character, a complex character infused by feelings of not belonging, of being lost in a labyrinth of solitude. The challenge for Mexicans in the future, according to Paz, is to find the way out of this labyrinth. The Labyrinth is also a reflection on the destiny of humankind, because the situation of modern Mexicans can be applied to any marginalized, isolated human living in any part of the world today.
The direction of Paz's analysis in The Labyrinth shows a transition from the examination of a particular and extreme example of Mexicanness in the first chapter, to an assessment of the situation of modern humankind in the last chapter and the appendix. In his search for Mexicanness, Paz begins his work by pointing out that Mexicans are different, first, from North Americans. Thus his analysis of the Pachucos (aka Zoot Suits), an extreme example of being Mexican because they don't live in Mexico any more, but in California and other southwestern states of the United States. 2 There they have lost, according to Paz, their Mexican heritage (their religion, language, customs and beliefs), and have been forced to live through the imitation of others; that is, to negate themselves. The Pachucos are contradictory beings and cultural orphans, lonely individuals looking for social integration.
The first chapter is crucial to understanding the whole work, because Paz presents there, for the first time, the problem he will treat in the following chapters: cultural orphanage and solitude. In the three subsequent chapters ('Mexican Masks', 'The Day of the Dead' and 'The Sons of the Malinche') Paz extends his analysis to seminal Mexican myths such as the mask, the fiesta, and machismo, among others, to explain the hermetic and lonely character of Mexicans in general. The results of his reflections in these historical-mythical chapters are themselves then used by Paz to transition to an analysis of specific historical forms that emerge, develop, flourish and dissolve in specific epochs. In Chapter 5 he analyzes the pre-hispanic world, the Conquest, and colonial Mexico; while in Chapter 6 he looks at Independence, Reform and the 1910 Revolution. Chapter 7, 'The Mexican Intelligentsia', discusses critically specific actors and ideologies that have failed to find an original cultural form that expresses Mexicanness without isolating Mexicans from the rest of the world. Chapter 8, 'The Present Day', contains the most universalistic essay. It is a reflection on the situation of modern humankind and the need to find a way out of the labyrinth of solitude by creating new cultural forms that recreate and modernize the lost image we all had once of ourselves and our communities. All of this leads to the Appendix, where Paz condenses and reprises his discoveries in the prior eight chapters, and depicts the crossing of Mexico and Mexicans with the desolate modern Western world.
In The Labyrinth, as in other critical and/or theoretical writings, Paz refuses to recognize disciplinary barriers and keeps to his heuristic inspiration, giving the impression of a highly individualistic and probing mind following inclination of interest rather than working at achieving systematization. He chooses neither an academic nor a scientific approach towards his object of study, utilizing a poetic language even when dealing with cultural, political and social issues. Hence we can place The Labyrinth in the category of what Durkheim would have called a 'bastard piece of work', something that does not fit into any clear-cut discipline. 3 This interdisciplinarity in the work does not mean that we cannot analyze separately its historical, philosophical, sociological, psychological and/or literary elements. In fact, numerous analyses of The Labyrinth have appeared in the half-century since its initial publication. 4 But while the approaches to finding a map of The Labyrinth have been largely literary, moral, psychological, philosophical-historical and cultural-anthropological, its sociological content has not been properly analyzed, and has at times been completely ignored. Hence the present study, which seeks to bring to light its sociological content by showing how closely the thinking of the German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel is reflected in The Labyrinth's structure.
The Paz-Simmel Connection
For the most part, the intellectual link between Simmel and Paz, and the impact of Simmel's thinking on The Labyrinth, has been regarded as too tenuous to merit more than a passing mention. The fact remains, however, that in his 1975 interview with Claude Fell (which was later published under the title 'Return to the Labyrinth of Solitude'), 5 Paz said this with respect to the sources that had influenced his book:
I also learned a lot from the German philosophers whom Ortega y Gasset had made known a few years before in our tongue: phenomenology, the philosophy of culture, and the work of historians and essayists such as Dilthey and Simmel. (Paz, 1985: 333) This is the only time that Paz made explicit mention of Simmel. In the interview he also notes the influence upon him of Borges, Caillois, Freud, Gaos, Lévi-Strauss, Marx, Nietzsche, Ortega y Gasset, Ramos, Reyes and Vasconcelos.
Probably the best-known analysis of The Labyrinth, and a text that has become one of the main vehicles of interpretation of the work, is Enrico Mario Santí's comprehensive introduction to it, entitled 'El Sueño Compartido' (The Shared Dream). In this study, Santí stresses the link between Paz and the Hegelian tradition:
It would be exaggerated to affirm, of course, that the primordial (or secret) source of The Labyrinth of Solitude is Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, even if it is justified to call Paz's book 'hegelian', in the widest sense of the word. The book barely mentions Hegel, in fact, and neither does Paz in the Fell interview, when he reviews his sources. In fact, the 'forms' that are invoked throughout the book do not belong entirely to the Idealist tradition, since they are neither static nor passive but, in contrast, active recipients, molded by historical experience, if inauthentic. Thus, the conception of 'forms' in the essay reflects more an intersection between Hegelian Idealism and Kantian formativity -for Kant, as is well known, only experience was, in effect, formative. Thus, the source of this intersection would not be really Hegel but the neo-Kantian Georg Simmel, especially the Simmel of Sociology (1908), whom Paz does mention in his interview with Fell as one of 'the German philosophers whom Ortega y Gasset had made known in our language.' Nevertheless, the influence of Simmel in the book is largely diffuse and general, since the 'forms' of Paz are not (with the possible exception of the 'pachuco') the social 'types' that he [Simmel] describes in his well-known treatise -the 'adventurer', 'the stranger' or 'the poor' -but inauthentic stages -in the sense of stations in the road to authenticity -and that instead go back to the Idealist morphology that had in Hegel its most lucid exponent. (Santí, 1997: 78-9) In relation to this passage, Santí provides two important footnotes. In the first of these, Santí actually calls into question the influence of Simmel upon The Labyrinth, by suggesting that 'It is also entirely probable that in the conception of the "forms", Paz had consulted Georges Gurvitch, whose Formas de la sociabilidad. Ensayos de sociología (Forms of Sociability: Essays in Sociology), in the translation [to Spanish] by Francisco Ayala, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1941, was in fashion at the time' (Santí, 1997: 79) . What are we to make of such a notion, given our understanding that it was Simmel's sociology of forms, not Gurvitch's, which at the time Paz was writing The Labyrinth had drawn great attention and aroused great controversy in Europe and the United States, and given Paz's own acknowledgment of Simmel's influence in his interview with Fell?
In the second of these two footnotes, Santí tells us of a letter Paz had written him, in response to Santí's affirmation that Paz's 'forms' were 'inauthentic'. Paz writes:
I never thought of the Forms as inauthentic stages towards this or that, but as historical creations in which the impulse, or the idea, becomes externalized and turns into long-lasting expressions, into objects of participation. For example, artistic styles, juridical institutions, some social idea, a myth, a religion, etc. . . . Precisely, the anguish I suffered at that time was that the inherited Forms were empty or petrified and that we Mexicans had not created another Form, our Form; that we had not realized ourselves in an enduring collective project. (Paz, 1997: 80) Anyone well acquainted with the work of both Paz and Simmel can't help but feel, on hearing those words, that Paz is virtually pointing out to Santí the need to first travel through Simmel's sociology of forms to draw an accurate map of The Labyrinth. Be that as it may, let us begin our own analysis by noting some of the striking similarities between Simmel's work and The Labyrinth of Solitude.
Similarities in Style and Content
There are various aspects of Georg Simmel's work that must have attracted the young Octavio Paz, writing his first major work in Paris a few years after the end of the Second World War. Surely one was Simmel's use of the essay as his favorite -and indeed only -vehicle of analysis. In fact, Simmel was recognized as one of the finest essayists of his time, not only in Germany but elsewhere in Europe. Another attraction for Paz must have been Simmel's method of inquiry. As Donald Levine points out:
His method is to select some bounded, finite phenomenon from the world of flux; to examine the multiplicity of elements which compose it; and to ascertain the cause of their coherence by disclosing its form. Secondarily, he investigates the origins of this form and its structural implications. . . . The results of Simmelian inquiry are therefore a series of discrete analyses. They do not lend themselves to being integrated through a single interpretative scheme. (Levine, 1971: xxxi) As for Paz himself, he has long been acknowledged one of the most refined essayists writing in the Spanish language. Fernando de Toro also points to another chief characteristic of the Paz essay: its open structure, expressive of an intense and ongoing search for a clue to human destiny. What the Pazian essay offers is 'questions, points of departure, attempts at definitive solutions, but never final answers. Its questions encompass life directly, and life is not closed but open, multiple, dialectical as reality ' (in Paz, 2000, vol. 2: 39) .
Thus it can be said that the essays (or chapters) that constitute The Labyrinth share with Simmel's sociological essays the following characteristics:
1. They comprise structurally open and discrete analyses that cannot easily be integrated into a whole. 2. They use dualism or dialectics as their principal analytical tool. 3. Their analyses reveal the interwoven nature of the assembled parts of the diversity of the social world. 4. They focus on the disclosure of social forms and types, in order to draw the spirit or destiny of a particular age.
This fourth point of resemblance is in fact the most crucial, for it is not so much the preference of both thinkers for the essay form that is relevant, as it is their shared fondness for abstracting forms out of the historical dimension, with Paz doing this in the Labyrinth as a key aspect of his quest for Mexican identity.
Perhaps both of these thinkers' obsessions with cultural forms was just the necessary prerequisite, however, for casting the world in terms of an oscillation between opposed categories and thereby underlining the dualistic dynamic of cultural identity. The dualism (which Paz calls dialectics) in the structure of The Labyrinth -with Mexican cultural identity emerging at intersections between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, loneliness or solitude, and participation or communion with others -parallels Simmel's dualism, wherein every aspect of life has its diametrically opposed element, so that a 'form is defined as a synthesis of opposites or as a midpoint between them' (Levine, 1971: xxxv) . This synthesis of opposites, however, is not the one Marx had in mind when applying his dialectical method to reality, but a paradoxical coexistence of extremes bound by a never-ending tension.
Where these two thinkers most strikingly intersect, however, is in their similar takes on alienation. Paz's conception of solitude hews closely to Simmel's alienation of culture, as opposed to Marx's alienation, based on economic factors, or Hegel's romantic/idealist variety. Paz is speaking in The Labyrinth of the deepest sort of cultural alienation, one that leads to solitude.
Marx thought of alienation as resting on expropriation, with direct producers being forcibly deprived of control over their products. Such a situation could conceivably be turned around. For Simmel, however, alienation is a less clear-cut matter; any given manifestation of it constitutes a particular vicissitude of the relationship an individual has to a set of objects, and, conceptually speaking, while that vicissitude may be probable it is not necessary, nor is it always irreversible. For Simmel, while modernity both intensifies the experience of alienation and widens its reach, alienation is a phenomenon inherent in the human condition. Unlike Marx, he sees no possibility of transcending this situation through revolution. Philosophically speaking, Simmel construes alienation as a variable but unavoidable psychological feature of the relationship between the subjective and objective spirits.
Indeed, in both Simmel's essays and Paz's Labyrinth, we find an ongoing battle between objective and subjective culture, and the appearance of a certain unhealthy objectification, with this leading to the oppression of the cultural forms that individuals have created. For Simmel the only way out of objectification/alienation, as for Paz from alienation/solitude, is through the creative act -which is to say, through a belief in the primacy of subjective culture (the individual) over objective culture (the network of countless individual creations). It should also be noted that these thinkers' shared vision of art as a unified form, as also of the artist as a cultural hero, reveals them as deeply rooted in the philosophy of Nietzsche. 6 Before we commence our discussion of Simmel's formal sociology and its influence on Paz, let us first take note of two other Simmelian themes that also pervade The Labyrinth: reciprocity and distance. With respect to reciprocity, or exchange, Simmel believed that no thing or event has any fixed, intrinsic meaning. Its meaning emerges only through its interactions with other things and events. Thus, an individual's understanding of cultural products arises strictly through his/her engagement with them. We find such instances of symbolic interactionism 7 all through the chapters of The Labyrinth, as for instance in the way the social type of the Pachuco is formed through the interaction of two forms: Mexicanness and the American way of life. When speaking of cultural forms, however, we must always remember that for Paz and Simmel, the place where all societal events actually occur is within the mind of individuals. In other words, these men's shared 'psychologistic concept of society' rests upon a definition of societal interaction as the interaction of psychic entities. It is important to mention that the psychologistic element in Simmel's sociology that Paz must have noted when reading his works has been criticized by other German thinkers such as Spahn and Weber. It's hard not to feel that Paz was attracted to and influenced by it, however, given the extensive use he made of Freudian psychoanalytic theory when constructing his Labyrinth.
As for that other vital element in Simmel's sociology known as 'distance', the properties of forms and the meanings of things are for Simmel functions of the relative distances between the individual and other individuals or things:
We obtain different pictures of an object when we see it at a distance of two, or five, or of ten yards. At each distance, however, the picture is 'correct' in its particular way and only in this way. And the different distance also provides different margins of error. . . . All we can say is that a view gained at a certain distance whatever has its own justification. It cannot be replaced or corrected by any other view emerging at another distance. . . . In a similar way, when we look at human life from a certain distance, we see each individual in his precise differentiation from all others. But if we increase our distance, the single individual disappears, and there emerges, instead, the picture of a 'society' with its own forms and colors -a picture which has its own possibilities of being recognized or missed. It is certainly no less justified than is the other in which the parts, the individuals, are seen in their differentiation. Nor is it by any means a mere preliminary of it. The difference between the two merely consists in the difference between purposes of cognition; and this difference, in turn, corresponds to a difference in distance. (Wolff, 1950: 7-8) Thus, for Simmel all social forms are defined to some extent in terms of the dimension of interpersonal distance. Some Simmelian forms, such as conflict and economic exchange, bring distant people into close contact. Others, like secrecy, increase the distance between people. Other forms, such as the social types of the stranger, the poor and the fashionable, comprise combinations of both nearness and distance.
In a similar fashion, we find in The Labyrinth the continuous use of social distance as an analytical tool, as seen in Paz's examination of social types like the Pachuco; the relative distances Mexicans choose to adopt visa-vis such cultural forms as the mask and the fiesta; the lack of recognition among Mexicans themselves, known as 'no-one-ness' or ninguneo; and Mexican courtesy, hypocrisy and dissimulation. Then too, in a broader sense social distance is a key element in The Labyrinth, since Paz goes back and forth between the individual Mexican and the social/cultural forms that he has developed over the years and centuries. Thus, among other things, The Labyrinth is an essay on social distance.
For too long now we have been talking about the concept of 'form', albeit for the good reason that it is the key to understanding the sociological content of The Labyrinth. In the next section we will see how, for Simmel, the task of the sociologist is largely confined to the identification and classification of social forms, and how it is Paz's need to identify and classify Mexican cultural and social forms that gives The Labyrinth its overall structure.
Simmel's Sociology of Forms, and Its Relevance to
The Labyrinth When Paz wrote to Santí (as mentioned before) that 'I never thought of the Forms as inauthentic stages towards this or that, but as historical creations . . .' and Santí relegated this important clarification to a footnote, we all lost an opportunity to analyze in depth, while Paz was still alive, the impact of Simmel's formal sociology on The Labyrinth. For Paz's letter 'corrects' Santi's assertion that Simmel's influence on The Labyrinth was 'largely diffuse and general', and that the Pazian 'forms' are not the social 'types' conceptualized by Simmel 'but inauthentic stages -in the sense of stations on the road to authenticity' that instead go back to Hegel. We don't know why Paz did not give the secret source to Santí on that occasion. Maybe simply because a labyrinth that provides its explorer with a clear-cut map is no true labyrinth at all?
In any case, only when we have accepted the notion that Paz adapts what Simmel calls 'forms of sociation' (cultural forms and social relations) to make his own sense of such Mexican social types as the Pachuco, can the actual influence of Simmel upon both the sociology and the methodology of The Labyrinth be disclosed to us.
Social Types and Forms in Simmel's Work
For Simmel, the world consists of innumerable contents, which are given a determinate identity, a particular structure and meaning, through the imposition of those forms that humans have created in the course of their collective experience. In other words, Simmel claims that forms have evolved in the course of human intellectual history, and they function as presuppositions on which experience rests.
Based on Goethe's idea that everything that is perfect or complete in its own way transcends itself, Simmel argues that an essential quality of life is the human capacity to produce entities (what he calls forms) that are more-than-life; that is, entities that can no longer be described as life. The properties of these entities or forms constitute what Simmel calls objective culture, and they are superimposed on what he calls subjective culture, that is, the result of the inner elaboration of materials coming from direct experience or life itself. Subjective culture, according to Simmel, is an elaboration that is partly cultural construction and partly spiritual forming according to one's unique position. Therefore, as Guy Oakes points out:
. . . [Simmel] notes that the ultimate result of the process of culture is paradoxical: life can only can be expressed in forms, however these forms have an intrinsic significance and an autonomous existence that remove them from the domain of life itself. This contradiction is the source of the tragedy of culture. (Simmel, 1980: 35, 36) Simmel's concern with socio-cultural forms rather than contents of social interaction does stem in part, as Santí points out, from his identification with the Kantian tradition in philosophy. But to see Simmel as merely a 'neo-Kantian' scholar, as Santí does, is reductionist. First, because Simmel's relationship to Kant is complicated and ambiguous. It is true that the elements of Kant's epistemology are among the presuppositions that guide Simmel's own philosophy and methodology. However, Simmel was inclined, particularly in his later years, to reject some of Kant's basic premises. 8 Second, Santi's view ignores the influence in Simmel's work of other thinkers, such as Goethe, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson and Schopenhauer, among others, as well as Simmel's long-standing interest in Lebensphilosophie and vitalism. 9 In any case, Simmel's concept of forms allows investigations of socialstructural properties by extracting certain commonalities from the bewildering and indistinguishable diversity of human interactions. Thus, the basic idea is a distinction between form and content. For Simmel, society exists when individuals enter into interaction, due to particular drives (examples: the erotic, the religious, the purely sociable) or purposes (he mentions defense and attack, entertainment and gainful employment, among many others). These drives and purposes are called 'contents' by Simmel. They are, so to speak, the raw material of forms. Social interaction means that different individuals (carrying within them the above-mentioned drives and purposes or contents) constitute units or forms of sociation: 'supraindividual interactional entities within which individuals are engaged and realize their interests' (Lawrence, 1976: 10) . Forms are analytic constructs that reveal the synthesizing processes by which individuals combine into supra-individual unities, stable or transient, solidary or antagonistic, as the case may be. Science, history, religion, art and eroticism are all forms, because 'they constitute conditions under which it is possible to have a certain kind of experience and acquire a certain kind of knowledge. Form therefore is an epistemological category' (Lawrence, 1976: 10) . In Simmel's view, the sociologist's task is to study the forms of human sociability, of human interaction, so that s/he can analyze the conditions under which they emerge, develop, flourish and dissolve. Simmel's distinction between form and content constitutes not only his fundamental methodological instrument, but also one of his most important contributions to the emergence of sociological theory. It has helped to foster the development of such new areas of study as symbolic interactionism, social psychology, urban sociology and, indeed, postmodern theory itself.
In addition, Simmel made a distinction between forms of interaction and social types. To avoid confusion -and to create meaning -people reduce their social world to a relatively few forms of interaction (Simmel noted, among others, conflict, superordination and subordination, secret societies, faithfulness and gratitude, urban life, and fashion and adornment) and a similarly small number of social types (such as the ones we have heard Santí mention: the stranger, the poor, the miser, the spendthrift, the adventurer, the nobility). As Simmel sees it, that reduction of the social types has been a necessary technique of psychic survival for those living in modern urban societies; categorizing our innumerable interactants by their seeming types allows us to then work backward, as it were, and encounter them more genuinely as specific persons.
Throughout his studies, Simmel speaks of both forms and types to develop his unique type of sociological analysis. Both social forms and social types are forms of social interaction, but for Simmel there is no oneto-one relationship between particular forms and contents. In fact, he argues that certain aspects of reality as constituted under one form can have the status of 'raw material' or 'content' from the perspective of another form. Language, for example, is the raw material of literature. In other words, the same content may be embraced by many different forms and the same form may be realized in many different contents. As Guy Oakes puts it:
Because man is constituted by a plurality of perspectives, it follows that the same homogenous manifold is constituted by a plurality of forms. Therefore any given phenomenon may be not only an object of desire, but also a theoretical knowledge, aesthetic evaluation, and religious significance. (1980: 15) This quality is particularly present in social forms and cultural forms, two categories that, according to Simmel, continually interpenetrate:
The facts of politics, religion, economics, law, culture styles, language, and innumerable others can be analyzed by asking how they may be understood, not as individual achievements or in their objective significance, but as products and developments of society. Nor would the absence of an exhaustive and undisputed definition of the nature of society render the cognitive value of this approach illusory. For it is characteristic of the human mind to be capable of erecting solid structures, while their foundations are still insecure. . . . If therefore, we apply the 'sociological method' to the investigation of the fall of the Roman Empire or the relation between religion and economics in the great civilizations or to the origin of the idea of the German national state or to the predominance of the baroque style; if, that is, we view this and similar phenomena as the result of indistinguishable contributions made by the interaction of individuals, or as life stages in the lives of superindividual groups, then we are, in point of fact, conducting our investigations according to the sociological method. And these investigations may be designated as sociology. (Wolff, 1950: 18-19) Such a passage leads me to concur with Donald Levine's (1971: xxvii) judgment that Simmel's 'excursions into the areas where society and culture interpenetrate include some of the most imaginative, and most neglected, pages of his work'. Certainly, such excursions became central to Simmel near the end of his life, and they will do much to illuminate his influence upon the construction of Paz's Labyrinth. Let us keep company with Donald Levine (1971: xxviii, xxix) a bit longer, however, as he makes three vital points about the Simmelian social and cultural forms.
1. Social forms provide us with contents that lend themselves particularly well to our elaborating into cherished cultural forms. Faith in another person, for instance, prefigures the faith elaborated in the symbolism of religion, just as the playing of social roles prefigures the art of the dramatic actor. 2. Social forms create conditions that affect the nature of certain cultural products. More particularly, the many types of exchange and the high number of interactions that characterize modern urban life create a need for distance from things; this is expressed in such cultural styles as symbolism, as well as in attitudes developed to counter the effects of the metropolis on the individual (the blasé attitude). 3. The cherishing of certain cultural forms creates a disposition to prefer social forms that are parallel to these in structure. Thus, a preference for symmetry in art fosters a like love for the planned symmetry of social forms, as under socialism.
As one would expect from a Nietzschean such as Simmel, a man who saw right through all pretensions to systematic and definitive completeness, this is not a thinker who gives us any precise, explicit method of identifying social types and social/cultural forms, or of assessing their degrees and modalities of interaction. As we heard Simmel himself say a moment ago, his aim was not to uncover a new reality but to develop a method that would allow us to more comprehensively survey the whole socio-historical world. This incomplete or unfinished aspect of Simmel's sociology certainly is mirrored in Paz's Labyrinth, and one can readily understand why both have been criticized for a lack of methodological coherence. Such criticism was to be expected, coming as it did at a time when 'scientific' and quantitative trends in sociology were gaining ground in Europe and especially in the United States, a time when sociology was intent on proving itself to be a discipline indeed. The emergence of postmodernism in recent decades, however, has brought the more qualitative approach preferred by Paz and Simmel back into favor, and has allowed us to see that the 'method' used by both men is even more akin to 'style' in art than it is to 'analysis' or 'inquiry' in science.
Social Types and Social/Cultural Forms in The Labyrinth
Anyone who is well acquainted with The Labyrinth of Solitude and with the work of Georg Simmel, can't help but feel that Octavio Paz has taken to heart Simmel's call for the sociologist to study the forms of human sociability, and the modes of human interaction, analyzing the conditions under which they emerge, develop, flourish and dissolve. To ensure that we begin this section on solid ground, however, let us start with the social types, for it is there that Santí has noted certain connections between Simmel and Paz. More precisely, we must begin with the link between the Pachuco, the protagonist of The Labyrinth's first chapter, and Simmel's famous essay 'The Stranger', a piece that triggered numerous sociological studies of social isolation and marginalization in different parts of the world. 10 There are, indeed, many parallels between the Stranger and the Pachuco. First, the initial chapter of The Labyrinth is, like 'The Stranger', a discussion of social distance. As we have noted, for both of these thinkers the properties of social types and the meanings of things are intrinsically tied to the relative distances between individuals and other individuals or things.
Simmel begins his essay by pointing out that:
. . . if wandering, considered as a state of detachment from every given point in space, is the conceptual opposite of attachment to any point, then the sociological form of 'the stranger' presents the synthesis, as it were, of both of these properties.
The stranger, he 'who comes today and stays tomorrow', has a social position that 'is fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it' (Levine, 1971: 143) . So too, Paz defines the Pachuco -an individual of Mexican origin who has lived in the United States for many years or even for generations -as someone who is definitely not an 'authentic' North American, and yet also feels ashamed of his origin:
What distinguishes them [the Pachucos], I think, is their furtive and restless air: they act like persons who are wearing disguises, who are afraid of a stranger's look because it could strip them naked. When you talk with them, you observe that their sensibilities are like a pendulum, but a pendulum that has lost its reason and swings violently and erratically back and forth. This spiritual condition or lack of spirit has given birth to a type known as the pachuco. . . . They can be identified by their language and behavior as well as by the clothing they affect. They are instinctive rebels, and North American racism has centered its wrath on them more than once. . . . The pachuco does not want to become Mexican again, at the same time he does not want to blend into the life of North America. His whole being is sheer negative impulse, a tangle of contradictions, an enigma. (Paz, 1985: 13-14) Note that the Pachuco, like the Stranger, can be understood only in terms of conflicts and contrasts between opposed categories -in this case, being Mexican on one part, and living in the United States on the other. Paz goes further, however, by suggesting that Mexico and the United States are true antagonists on the cultural level:
The North Americans are credulous and we are believers; they love fairy tales and detective stories and we love myths and legends. The Mexican tells lies because he delights in fantasy, or because he is desperate, or because he wants to rise above the sordid facts of his life; the North American does not tell lies, but he substitutes social truth for the real truth, which is always disagreeable. We get drunk in order to confess; they get drunk in order to forget. They are optimists and we are nihilists -except that our nihilism is not intellectual but instinctive, and therefore irrefutable. We are suspicious and they are trusting. We are sorrowful and sarcastic and they are happy and full of jokes. North Americans want to understand and we want to contemplate. They are activists and we are quietists, we enjoy our wounds and they enjoy their inventions. (Paz, 1985: 23-4) This superlatively Pazian passage could not be more illustrative of the dualism that characterizes Simmel's sociology, with each aspect of life implying the coexistence of a diametrically opposed aspect. Inevitably, the Pachuco came to be defined as a synthesis of opposites or an extreme point -hence this chapter's title of 'The Pachuco and Other Extremities'.
In a fashion similar to that of the Stranger, the Pachuco finds his meaning, his form, through his interactions with other cultural facts that are elements of the American form, such as the American city and American racism. Only in this way can the Pachuco's marginality, odd behaviors and hybrid fashion, be understood. Also as in Simmel, for Paz the place where all our social interactions are processed and distilled is the mind; hence the Pachuco's 'furtive' and 'restless' air, his fear of strangers, and their language and clothing -all of those being aspects of 'alienation in the making', so to speak. Those allusions to clothing are not random ones, by the way, for in fact Simmel was a pioneer when it came to taking fashion as a sociological fact. So too, Paz discusses at length the sociological meaning of the Pachuco's clothing, defining it as 'grotesque dandyism':
The pachuco carries fashion to its ultimate consequences and turns it into something aesthetic. One of the principles that rules North American fashions is that clothing must be comfortable, whereas the pachuco, by changing ordinary apparel into art, makes it 'impractical'. Hence it negates the very principles of the model that inspired it. . . . Eccentrics usually emphasize their decision to break away from society -either to form new and more tightly closed groups or to assert their individuality -through their way of dressing. In the case of the Pachuco there is an obvious ambiguity: his clothing spotlights and isolates him, but at the same time it pays homage to the society he is attempting to deny. (Paz, 1985: 15-16) Similar as the Pachuco and the Stranger clearly are in some respects, though, the distance/nearness paradigm can't help but assert itself by making them different as well. The form or type of the Stranger is constructed from the gazes of others, and hence chiefly sociological, moving as it does from outer 'reality' to interior psychic world. We sense from Paz's descriptions of the Pachuco, on the other hand, an interior world, where a group consciousness is revealed by returning the harshly appraising North American gaze, with the overall feeling thus being even more psychological than sociological.
Another clear difference: Simmel's Stranger, while not a universal social type (Simmel did not believe in timelessly valid social laws), 11 is nevertheless a type that can be applied fruitfully to multiple historical cases. This fact helps us to understand why his Stranger has neither name, nationality nor ethnic identity; s/he could just as easily be a Jew, an Indian, a Muslim or a Mexican. In marked contrast to this, Paz's stranger does have a name -the Pachuco -and he exists within one cultural form that we may call 'Mexicanness', albeit while holding an extreme position there. It is a testament to the overall ambience of The Labyrinth, however, that as we read about the Pachuco he takes on for us the quality of any marginalized, isolated human living in any part of the world.
Still, what are we to make of the fact that although in this book Paz does look at such diverse social types as the Cacique, the Indian, the Criollo, the Mestizo, the Macho and the suffering Mexican woman, all of these are subsumed within broader social or cultural forms in the seven chapters and appendix that follow the first chapter on the Pachuco? I would suggest that the structure of The Labyrinth itself gives us a transition from social types -what one might deem the micro-Simmelian forms of sociation -to larger forms. Among the cultural (historical-mythical) forms dealt with are the mask, the fiesta, and the Malinche or Malinchismo (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). These forms, which have solidified over time to become traditions and/or myths, are themselves then used by Paz to make yet another transition, this time to an analysis of those more perishable forms that emerge, develop, flourish and dissolve in specific historical epochs. Thus, Chapter 5 analyzes the pre-hispanic world, the Conquest and colonial Mexico, while Chapter 6 looks at Independence, Reform and the 1910 Revolution. Chapter 7, 'The Mexican Intelligentsia', gazes through a glass darkly at the key actors and ideologies that have striven in vain to unite the subjective and objective elements of the Mexican character and thereby forge a true national identity. Chapter 8, 'The Present Day', is of special interest because it was written almost a decade after the first edition appeared in 1950. Most notably germane to our present purpose is the fact that, even as in this chapter on the situation of modern humankind Paz discards many of the concepts he used in 1950, the concept of form remains central to his analysis. All of these transitions lead the reader to the Appendix (written in 1950, along with the original work). Here Paz not only condenses and reprises the forms discovered in the prior eight chapters, but adds a treatment of eroticism, marriage and prostitution that is recognizably Simmelian and that we shall be returning to in the ensuing section -all of this being done to depict the crossing of Mexico and Mexicans and the desolate modern Western world. This pessimistic depiction reminds us of Simmel's 'tragedy of culture', where the relationship between life and form and between subjective and objective culture is viewed as 'conflictual, crisis-ridden and tragic, and, for Simmel, crucial to understanding "the disharmony of modern life" ' (Frisby and Featherstone, 1997: 5) .
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of The Labyrinth, which are devoted to an exploration of the conditions through which key mythical forms constituting Mexican identity have emerged, Paz seems to mix on his palette Simmel's formal sociology and Freud's psychoanalytic theory, as a way of more broadly depicting the complexity of the Mexican spirit that he had drawn, almost as a caricature, in the first chapter on the Pachuco. The form of the mask, for instance, is filled with such contents as hypocrisy, dissimulation, 'noneness' (ninguneo) and repression of the affective life -with all of those being found par excellence in the social type of the Mexican macho. These are also the elements that tend to construct a cultural form characterized by formulaic behavior, decorum, and outright hypocrisy. This oppressive mask came into being largely as an after-shock of the Conquest, that is, of the confrontation between two wildly disparate cultural forms: Indian and Spanish. The endproduct of this clash of civilizations is, according to Paz, a lack of authenticity. That's the content that fills the mask: lack and inauthenticity. And yet, however inauthentic the mask may be, as cultural form it pervades Mexican life. Surely it was this failure of Mexican subjectivity and creativity, and hence of true communion as individuals, that Paz had in mind when he wrote to Santí and told him, as noted before, that the forms in The Labyrinth are real, but alas, inauthentic, in the sense that they do not truly represent Mexicans. 'It is not our form', Paz stressed at the end of the letter (1997: 80).
Pessimistic as that may sound, in the chapter of The Labyrinth entitled 'The Day of the Dead', Paz offers us, in marked contrast to the inauthentic character of the mask form, a dialectically opposed and liberating cultural form: the fiesta. Not only have Mexicans been able to keep the fiesta historically alive through the centuries, but both Paz and Simmel would deem it an art form, since it is characterized by 'unity of spirit': it has the power to transport Mexicans out of their solitude, causing them to throw away their masks and participate creatively and authentically in the collective life.
Let it also be noted at this juncture, given that Paz has been criticized by some 12 for supposedly not making his methodological strategy explicit in The Labyrinth, that in fact every single chapter is replete with detailed explanations of whichever cultural form he is there elaborating upon. The chapter on Mexican masks, for example, begins with this elucidating passage:
The Mexican macho -the male -is a hermetic being, closed up in himself, capable of guarding both himself and whatever has been confided to him. Manliness is judged according to one's vulnerability to enemy arms or the impacts of the outside world. . . . This predominance of the closed over the open manifests itself not only as impassivity and distrust, irony and suspicion, but also as a love for Form. Form surrounds and sets bound to our privacy, limiting its excesses, curbing its explosions, isolating and preserving it. Both our Spanish and Indian heritages have influenced our fondness for ceremony, formulas, and order. . . . The ritual complications of our courtesy, the persistence of classical Humanism, our fondness for closed poetic forms (the sonnet and the decima, for example), our love for geometry in the decorative arts and for design and composition in painting, the poverty of our Romantic art compared with the excellence of our Baroque art, the formalism of our political institutions, and, finally, our dangerous inclination toward formalism, whether social, moral, or bureaucratic, are further expressions of that tendency in our character. The Mexican not only does not open himself up to the outside world, he also refuses to emerge from himself, to 'let himself go'.
Sometimes Form chokes us. During the past century the liberals tried vainly to force the realities of the country into the straitjacket of the Constitution of 1857. The results were the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz and the Revolution of 1910. In a certain sense the history of Mexico, like that of every Mexican, is a struggle between the forms and formulas that have been imposed on us and the explosions with which our individuality avenges itself. Form has rarely been an original creation; an equilibrium arrived at through our instincts and desires rather than at their expense. On the contrary, our moral and juridical forms often conflict with our nature, preventing us from expressing ourselves and frustrating our true wishes. . . . Our devotion to Form, even when empty, can be seen throughout the history of Mexican art from pre-Conquest times to the present . . . (Paz, 1985: 30-3) Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of that long passage, and the one most reminiscent of Simmel's methodology (how he connects the closed-ness or openness of forms with history, politics, law and religion), is the way Pazian forms emerge either autochthonally -as in pre-hispanic Mexico -or are imposed from the outside -as after the Spanish conquest of the 16th century and via the Constitution of 1857.
When Paz refers to a form as being 'open', he means that there is enough content within or beneath the form to sustain it. Gradually forms close, however, leaving the content, the participation of individuals outside of them, and producing a sense of passivity rather than activity. Social structures were largely open, for example in Mexico's pre-hispanic days and during the first part of the colonial era, but an event such as the tragic life of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz 13 signaled the closing of the colonial form. Whenever a form becomes completely empty or petrified, there ensues a rupture, an explosion. That generally engenders new open forms, which again enter into a process of growth and decay. Two such eruptions for Paz are the movement for Mexican Independence at the beginning of the 19th century and the Mexican Revolution of the second decade of the 20th century.
A close reader of The Labyrinth can't help but wonder whether Paz didn't consciously assimilate there Simmel's idea that the human mind is capable of erecting solid structures even while their foundations are still insecure -an idea that makes one think of postmodernism's belief in a lack of origin. In Chapter 6, for example, Paz looks at the Reforma, a late 19th-century liberal critique of the old regime and a secular vision of a bold new social contract. What he sees there is a Mexico negating its past and thus erecting a structure without foundations. Thus, for Paz the Reforma form is one that that strives to affirm man and yet almost fatally undermines itself by ignoring the Mexico of the past, the Mexico of the myths, the fiesta and the Virgin of Guadalupe. While conceding that the Reforma marks the start of modernity for Mexico by being universalistic, secular, and profane, Paz sees in this new form not the explosion and authenticity of the Independence or the Revolution movements (both falling under the form of the fiesta) but rather the onset of a period of historic inauthenticity (characteristic of the form of the mask) marked by widespread simulation, born in response to the imposition of an alien positivism on the Mexican soul: 'not a religion but an ideology' (Paz, 1997: 270) . The felt need for a rupture out of this oppressive form produced the 1910 Revolution, a form full of aggression but also a 'real revelation of ourselves' (Paz, 1997: 275) and a harbinger of a more genuine universality, one that would simultaneously insert Mexicans into world history and reintegrate them with their own past.
Let us just note, in closing this section, that for both Simmel and Paz social forms and social types provide contents which lend themselves particularly well to the elaboration of certain cultural forms. We have already noted how the closed quality of the Mexican macho (a social type with such contents as hermeticism, distrust, irony, suspicion, fondness for ceremony) is mirrored in those closed Mexican forms -social, political, artistic -that, according to Paz, 'choke us'. In other words, as we find in Simmel's essays on cultural forms, in The Labyrinth orientation to certain social forms creates a disposition to prefer cultural forms that are parallel in structure. Thus, the Mexican preference for closed poetic forms, for geometry in the decorative arts, for Baroque (a closed form according to Paz) instead of Romantic art (an open form), and so on.
The Impact of a 'Secret Text' on The Labyrinth
Finally, we arrive at our key questions: just how much did Paz read Simmel during those years in Paris, and which Simmelian texts prove the strong influence of Simmel's thought upon The Labyrinth? We must begin by assuming that Paz had not read much of Simmel prior to writing The Labyrinth, otherwise he would have made more extensive mention of him in his comments on influential authors and sources in the interview with Claude Fell. I have already made my best case for 'The Stranger' (1908) as a key inspiration for the first chapter on the Pachuco. Then too, Paz's use of the Form as his central methodological tool points to his most likely having read some of the essays in Simmel's Sociology (1908) , such as 'The Problem of Sociology'. It is also hard to believe, when one recalls Paz's meditations on fashion and style in the context of the Pachuco's encounter with North American urban life, that Paz had not also read 'Fashion' (1904) and 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (1903) .
Although all of the above pieces by Simmel certainly seem to show up, in one way or the other, in the structure of The Labyrinth, I believe the key text directly connecting Simmel to The Labyrinth, what I am here playfully calling 'the secret text', is a very late essay, 'The Conflict of Culture' written in 1918, just a few months before Simmel's death from liver cancer. This extraordinary essay with its powerful vision of the tragedy of culture is in many ways Simmel's last will and testament.
There Simmel dilates upon the eternal conflict between established forms and the needs of the ongoing life-process -the theme which, above all others, filled his final years. Its influence upon The Labyrinth becomes clear when one finds in it a virtual laundry list of elements vitally present in The Labyrinth: And there is even a discussion of eroticism, marriage and prostitution as forms -perfectly mirrored in Paz's own discussion found in the appendix to The Labyrinth.
Many of those themes can be detected in the following extracts from 'The Conflict of Culture':
We speak of culture whenever life produces certain forms in which it expresses and realizes itself: works of art, religion, sciences, technologies, laws, and innumerable others. These forms encompass the flow of life and provide it with content and form, freedom and order. But although these forms arise out of the life process, because of their unique constellation they do not share the restless rhythm of life, its ascent and descent, its constant renewal, its incessant divisions and reunifications. These forms are frameworks for the creative life which, however, soon transcends them. They should also house the imitative life, for which, in the final analysis, there is no space left. They acquire fixed identities, a logic and lawfulness of their own: this new rigidity inevitably places them at a distance from the spiritual dynamic which created them and which makes them independent. . . . Herein lies the ultimate reason why culture has a history. Insofar as life, having become spirit, ceaselessly creates such forms which become selfenclosed and demand permanence, these forms are inseparable from life; without them it cannot be itself. Left to itself, however, life streams out without interruption, its restless rhythm opposes the fixed duration of any particular form. Each cultural form, once it is created, is gnawed at at varying rates by the forces of life. As soon as one is fully developed, the next begins to form; after a struggle that may be long or short, it will inevitably succeed its predecessor. (Levine, 1971: 375-6) Thus, for Simmel life, while manifesting itself through particular forms, is always struggling against these forms, because they become fixed, or 'petrified' as Paz would say. This constant change in the content of culture, even of whole cultural styles is, according to Simmel, 'the sign of the infinite fruitfulness of life', but it also marks the deep contradiction between life's eternal flux and the objective validity and authenticity of forms: 'It moves constantly between death and resurrection -between resurrection and death' (Levine, 1971: 376) .
This oscillation from one pole to another, this paradoxical coexistence of extremes bound by a never-ending tension, implies a certain rhythm of life, and we heard Simmel speak above of 'the restless rhythm of life, its ascent and descent, its constant renewal, its incessant divisions and reunifications'. So too, Paz, in his essay 'Respuesta y algo más' (Answer and Something More), lets us know that The Labyrinth offers us no mere 'psychology of the Mexican' but rather a description of a vital and historic rhythm (the dialectic between solitude and communion) 'during one moment and in one nation' (Paz, 1997: 566) .
Precisely because 'life perceives the form as such as something that has been forced upon it', the Simmelian ruptures and revolutions must arise in order to 'burst the oppressive bonds' of the old forms and replace them with new ones. For Paz, these 'crucial moments of authenticity' can be clearly seen in the Mexican Revolution, 'a sudden immersion of Mexico in her own being, from which she brought back up, almost blindly, the essentials of a new kind of state'. Furthermore, the Revolution was:
. . . an explosion of reality: a return and a communion, an upsetting of old institutions, a releasing of many ferocious, tender, and noble feelings that have been hidden by our fear of being. (Paz, 1985: 149) Thus both Simmel and Paz view form as a central but also an ephemeral structure, 'a central idea from which spiritual movements originate and towards which they seem to be oriented' (Levine, 1971 : 378) -a notion that can't help but bring to mind Foucault's idea of historical phases or forms as constituting 'regimes of truth'.
Each new regime fills social and cultural forms with initial contents gathered around a central idea that changes gradually as life relentlessly leapfrogs its way forward:
In every single epoch the central idea resides wherever the most perfect being, the most absolute and metaphysical phase of reality joins with the highest values, with the most absolute demands on ourselves and on the world. . . . For Greek classicism it was the idea of being, of the uniform, the substantial, the divine. . . . The Christian Middle Ages placed in its stead the concept of God as at once the source and goal of all reality. . . . Since the Renaissance, this place has come to be occupied gradually by the concept of nature. It appeared as the only being and truth, yet also an ideal, as something that first had to be represented and insisted upon. At first this occurred among artists, for whom the final kernel of reality embodied the highest value. (Levine, 1971: 378) Inevitably, for both Paz and Simmel as good Nietzscheans, the tragic conflict arising out of the ongoing opposition between form and spirit comes to a head in the life and work of the creative artist. Thus we are not surprised to find Simmel treating Van Gogh as a man who found a way to transcend the restrictive cultural and artistic forms of his day, or to hear that for Paz it is Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz's tragic life that represents the creative act as 'the struggle for self identity' (Levine, 1971: 382) .
In The Labyrinth, however, and in the Simmel pieces that we are here positing as its precursors, the accent is less on the Promethean figure of the artist as form-breaker and form-maker, and more on the seeming coldness and solidity of the cultural edifices that s/he finds ranged against him/her. Simmel notes, for instance, how:
The closed system aims to unite all truths, in their more general concepts, into a structure of higher and lower elements which extend from a basic theme, arranged symmetrically and balanced in all directions. The decisive point is that it sees the proof of its substantive validity in the architectural and aesthetic completion, in the successful closure and solidity of its edifice. (Levine, 1971: 387) One immediately thinks after reading those words, of the Mexican pre-hispanic pyramid, used in The Labyrinth as a metaphor for form. And yet whereas in this particular piece Simmel is trying to evoke not the perpetual incipience of revolution but rather the seeming imperturbableness of the cultural form -so too, Paz's pyramid has its higher and lower elements, is arranged symmetrically, and is balanced in all directions -for Paz the pyramid's very shape seems to bespeak a hope of some avant-garde artistic idea that will lead to new and more organic, less rigidly form-like, social structures.
All of the above-mentioned theoretical similarities between Simmel's 'The Conflict of Culture' and Paz's Labyrinth lead us to one last point of convergence, which, I believe supports and enhances the idea that 'The Conflict of Culture' is the key or 'secret text' unlocking the structural base underlying The Labyrinth. It might seem peripheral, but Paz and Simmel construct their discussions on eroticism, marriage and prostitution in these two works in ways that closely mirror each other.
One could choose to think of the erotic life as a free-flowing river, and hence as not merely informal but anti-formal. Simmel and Paz are as one, though, in their understanding that it is in the realm of Eros that cultural forms and social taboos have left one of their deepest imprints in society. In keeping with our usual pattern, let us listen to Simmel first:
A systematic critique of existing sexual relationships has been named 'the new morality'. It is propagated by a small group, but its aims are shared by a large one. Its criticism is directed mainly against two elements of the contemporary scene: marriage and prostitution. Its basic theme can be expressed as follows: the most personal and intimate meaning of erotic life is destroyed by the forms in which our culture has reified and trapped it. Marriage, which is entered into for a thousand nonerotic reasons, is destroyed from within by a thousand unyielding traditions and legalized cruelties; where it is not wrecked, it loses all individuality and leads to stagnation. Prostitution has almost turned into a legal institution which forces the erotic life of young people into a dishonorable direction which contradicts and caricatures its inner-most nature. Marriage and prostitution alike appear as oppressive forms which thwart immediate genuine life. Under different cultural circumstances, these forms may not have been so inappropriate. . . . We can see here how large a shadow falls between the will to destroy old forms and the desire to build new ones. (Levine, 1971: 388) In his appendix to The Labyrinth, Paz proposes that pure eroticism or pure love 'is almost an inaccessible experience' because 'everything is against it: morals, classes, laws, races, and the very lovers themselves' (Paz, 1985: 197) . He points out that:
When we reach out to touch her, we cannot even touch unthinking flesh, because this docile, servile vision of a surrendering body always intrudes. . . . Society denies the nature of love by conceiving it as a stable union whose purpose is to beget and raise children. It identifies it, that is, with marriage, the severity of the punishment depending on the time and place. . . . The stability of the family depends upon marriage, which becomes a mere protection for society with no other object but the reproduction of that same society. . . . As a result of this protection afforded to marriage, love is persecuted and prostitution is either tolerated or given official blessing. (Paz, 1985: 198-200) Can we dismiss the intense similarity of these two viewpoints as 'mere coincidence'? To do so, we would also need to extend the reach of coincidence to another aspect of these men's sociological meditations: the relevance of the religious life. According to Simmel: The forms which objectify and direct religious feeling are felt to be inadequate for contemporary life. . . . The most decisive instance of this development -even though it may be full of contradictions and be eternally separated from its objective -is a tendency for forms of religious beliefs to dissolve into modes of religious life, into religiosity as a purely functional justification of religion. . . . In the ultimate state of affairs towards which this new tendency is aiming, religion would function as a medium for the direct expression of life. (Levine, 1971: 389-90) Such a passage brings to mind Paz's own deep understanding that the seemingly extensive realm covered by the term 'secular' is often only skin-deep. He stresses in The Labyrinth, for instance, that merely imposed, strictly ideological forms such as the Reforma, are all too likely to be blown away by the wind, because they are not deeply rooted in the religious life of the people. Like Simmel and Simmel's friend Max Weber, Paz knew that even if large numbers of people think that the supernatural objects of religious belief have been radically excised, the religious impulse has in fact by no means been eliminated. He was well aware that the 'space of life', which seemingly is filled to overflowing with those strictly secular contents, known as action, thought, and feeling, is above all permeated with 'that unique tension and peace, danger and consecration, which can only be called religious' (Levine, 1971: 391) .
Conclusion: Toward a New Interpretation of the Pazian Sociology
It has been suggested here that what one encounters when reading 'The Conflict in Modern Culture' is not just a superbly original piece of work but also the basic sociological/philosophical framework which Octavio Paz commandeered so as to bring continuity and structure to his Labyrinth.
Needless to say, those who tell us that they have detected other seminal influences within The Labyrinth are by no means merely deceived. Pazian alienation, for instance, can be traced back not just to Simmel, but also to Durkheim's concept of anomie, and even to Weber's 'iron cage'. But not to Freud, for in the late Freud of Civilization and Its Discontents, human liberation and civilization are opposed categories that provoke discontent and frustration when they are brought together, whereas the 'authentic' form that Paz is always in search of is de facto unitary. Thus, much as I respect Enrico Santí's analysis of The Labyrinth, I do feel it leans unduly on the Freudian categories, since any use of Freudian analysis by Paz can be understood as being only a single element within the all-embracing Simmelian sociology of forms. Another problematic aspect of Santí's analysis in 'El Sueño Compartido' is that he tends to contrive new divisions or categories, as opposed to attempting incorporations. For example, he puts myth into an altogether different category from historical form and from such social types as the Pachuco. They are all forms, and they all come together to give The Labyrinth its original structure and its theoretical coherence.
To return to the fact of the widespread discernible influences on The Labyrinth, it is important to underline that one also can find the concepts of open and closed forms, and of the rhythm of life in Bergson, the evolution and decay of cultural forms in Toynbee, and the importance of the religious feeling in such disciples of Durkheim as his nephew Marcel Mauss, and in others like Lévy-Bruhl and, especially for Paz, Roger Caillois. And yet none of those thinkers brought together, as Simmel did in 'The Conflict of Modern Culture', all of these dispersed elements into a coherent whole, and above all into a methodology that Paz could then use to analyze the intersection of nationalism and modernity in Mexico.
None of this is meant to imply, however, that Paz's relationship to Simmel, in writing The Labyrinth, was merely one of discipleship. Yes, Paz relied closely on Simmel, but he did so only in his own characteristically eclectic fashion. Nor do I mean to deny for a moment the value of the contributions made by Enrico Santí and others, 14 for within The Labyrinth's Simmelian walls we do find Paz employing Freudian analysis to substantiate his ruminations on Mexican forms, drawing upon many elements of Durkheim's theory, and so on. And while The Labyrinth can be deemed one of the few successful examples -and certainly one of the most famous -of the application of the Simmelian method to a specific case -that of Mexican national identity -its classification within the wide discipline of sociology remains no easy task.
Perhaps we do best to think of The Labyrinth less as an example of formal sociology and more as being situated within that field that was emerging at the time of its writing: the sociology of knowledge. This field, first developed by Simmel's student Karl Mannheim, sought to bring together psychology, history and phenomenology's emphasis on mental phenomena, to create an original method to be used in the study of immaterial, intellectual-spiritualistic realities.
To fully untangle this fascinating relationship between the Labyrinth and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge would require far more time and space than is available to me here. I do however wish to mention two hopeful-looking avenues of research in this regard. The first vital difference I am thinking of here, between the Pazian and the Simmelian visions of sociology, is that the latter largely confines the sociologist to identifying and classifying the various forms of social interaction. As Alfred Vierkandt points out, Simmel's analysis was not focused on judgment: 'It does indeed distinguish between the lighter and darker sides of our culture, but not really between good and evil in the sense of what is worth striving for and what not ' (in Frisby and Featherstone, 1997: 20) .
It is important to underline that Simmel wrote newspaper and magazine articles in support of free trade unions, socialized medicine, against political censorship of the theatre, as well as for the development of a women's movement. Still, his mostly non-evaluative stance, as Vierkandt rightly describes it, should be taken into consideration to understand his intellectual and academic position. Especially important to this study is his take on alienation, that is, that philosophically speaking Simmel construes alienation as a variable but unavoidable psychological feature of the relationship between the subjective and objective spirits. In this respect it is different from a sociology that strives toward evaluation, and finding a successful exit from alienation, as seen in Paz and Mannheim. This takes us to the second possible avenue of research. Both Paz and Mannheim share the goal of evaluating the systematic totality of ideas in order to derive the 'spirit of the epoch' and to look for a way to transcend the intellectual crisis that modernity has imposed upon humans. Both thinkers differ from Simmel by dint of their higher degree of interest in the functional relationship between ideas and the broader social setting. For Mannheim, sociology is 'a discipline which explores the functional dependence of each intellectual standpoint on the differentiated social-group reality standing behind it, and which sets itself the task of retracing the evolution of the various standpoints' (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004: 364) . Surely this is precisely the kind of functionalism we encounter in The Labyrinth, where Paz traces the threads of all ideas -and indeed of knowledge in general -back to the social worlds from which they have emerged, be they cultural realities or historical epochs.
Granted, one can easily point to a functionalist element in Simmel's work as well. Santí has been right, though, to sense that the functionalism of The Labyrinth is less Simmelian than that of such disciples of Durkheim as Mauss and Caillois. Paz follows Durkheim's insight into the central role played by supposedly 'pathological' traits in society that block a stable and healthy functioning of the social life, as we can see in the almost deviant social types he develops in The Labyrinth, such as the Pachuco, the Macho and the suffering Mexican woman, among others. This connection also reminds us that other key Durkheimian concepts such as anomie and solidarity need more attention for a complete understanding of Paz's sociology. And of course, without this active presence of the Durkhemian elements -the latter being inserted by Santí into his category 'the sociology of the sacred' -we could never admire as we do Paz's depictions in The Labyrinth of the conflict between ideology and religion, or his deep understanding of the important role played by 'religious feeling' in the ongoing construction of Mexican national identity.
It could be said that Paz uses the theories of the Durkheim school much as he uses those of Freud: to draw distinctions between form and content -in the latter case the 'sacred' content latent within the Mexican mythical and historical forms. All of which brings us back to Simmel by another road, however. For whereas Durkheim, Freud and other theorists helped Paz to amplify and diversify the scope of his analysis, it can only have been the example of Simmel and his concept of forms that led Paz to build the actual walls of The Labyrinth so well that they are still standing today, more than half a century after their creation. Notes 1. The first studies on Mexicanness appeared at the beginning of the 20th century: Chávez (1901) and Guerrero (1901) . The most prominent example of a study on the United States it had an important impact on Robert Park, Everett Stonequist and Louis Wirth, among others. We can also see a connection with David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd, and even with Albert Camus' The Stranger. 11. This is another point where Simmel and Kant diverge. Arguing in opposition to the Kantian view of the timelessness of a priori categories, Simmel points out that forms are subject to historical variations and transformations (see Oakes, 1980: 18) . 12. Besides Emanuel Carballo, mentioned at the beginning of this article, The Labyrinth was criticized by other Mexican intellectuals such as Fernando Benitez, Ruben Salazar Mallen, Leopoldo Zea, Juan Hernandez Luna and even Samuel Ramos, an important influence on Paz at the time he was writing The Labyrinth. For an interesting discussion of the reception of The Labyrinth in Mexico see Santí (1997: 45-65) . 13. Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1648-95) is best known as a major Baroque literary figure of Mexico. However, her desire to understand everything around her, coupled with her studies in classical and medieval philosophy, and her fierce assertion of a woman's right to fully participate in scholastic inquiry mark her as a philosopher and early feminist as well. In her teens, she abandoned the life of a court favorite to become a nun. In her convent in Mexico City she wrote religious poems, songs and plays as well as secular ones, and had influential patrons. Her tragic end had to do, precisely, with her notoriety and the fact that she was a woman. Theology was a topic that Sor Juana avoided until 1690. Why she then wrote a letter with a critical analysis of a sermon given by a Jesuit priest is unknown. It was published, despite the statement by the Bishop of Puebla that it was meant to be read only by him. She wrote her famous Response to the letter, which was supposed to be a promise to stop writing secular works. It was not. It was a defense of her literary career. Under pressure from the Archbishop of Mexico and the Viceroy, she stopped writing altogether and handed over her books and scientific instruments. She died a few years later. One of Octavio Paz's most famous work is a biography of Sor Juana entitled Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz o las trampas de la fe. 14. For an illuminating analysis of the influence of Freud upon The Labyrinth, see the essay by Thomas Mermall entitled 'The Labyrinth of Solitude and the Psychoanalysis of History' (in Paz, 2000: 18-35) .
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